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COMMENTARIES
Corporate Power and its Discontents
GERALD BERKt
In Planet of the APs, Professor Galanter draws a
distinction between artificial and natural persons,
organizations and individuals, corporations and primordial
associations; then he shows how artificial persons have
come to dominate the legal system. Exploiting their vast
organizational resources, artificial persons systematically
overpower associations and individuals in head-to-head
contests of litigation. But their influence does not stop at
the bench. Artificial persons have reshaped the legal
profession: prestige goes to those who represent corporate,
not individual, clients. Perhaps most devastating for the
rule of law is that artificial persons have learned to reshape
legal doctrine to their advantage by litigating rules, rather
than discrete rights. In a word, corporate persons have
become hegemonic. They shape the rules of the game,
professional norms, and legal outcomes.
Although the distinction between artificial and natural
persons illuminates inequality, I believe it obscures our
understanding of the causes of corporate power, the nature
of opposition, and the options available to tame it. My
comments will tell a different narrative about the origins
and development of corporate power, which will make three
points. First, I will show how the organizational power of
corporations has roots in the law, where a natural, not
artificial, theory of the corporate person has reigned.
t Department of Political Science, University of Oregon.
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Second, I will show how those who have contested corporate
power are not well understood as natural persons or
primordial associations. They have also been constituted
legally and, more often than not, in relation to the business
corporation. Finally, I will show how intellectuals and
associations, who have sought to redress inequality, have
taken very different positions on the status of the
corporation. One group, which I shall call the critical
reifiers, has embraced the natural corporate person because
it legitimates the natural status of oppositional associations.
Another group, which I shall call the critical denaturalizers,
has opposed efforts to naturalize the corporate person
because it creates unassailable privileges. By reconfiguring
Professor Galanter's categories into a different story about
corporate power and its discontents, I hope to deepen our
understanding of the relationship between the corporation
and the law, and broaden our sense of how Americans have
responded to corporate power.
Once upon a time, corporations were artificial
constructs created by the state or the individuals who
owned them. As Morton Horwitz shows, in antebellum
America states issued corporate charters for public
purposes with specific rights and obligations. When a
plaintiff challenged corporate behavior, judges asked
whether the defendant had acted ultra vires, or beyond its
public charter. In the 1830s, Jacksonians attacked the
special corporate charter as "class legislation," which
created privilege and corrupted the state's obligation to act
in the public interest. Instead of doing away with the
corporate instrument altogether, Jacksonians opened the
charter to all through general incorporation laws. As a
result, incorporation became the favored instrument for
entrepreneurs attempting to raise large amounts of capital.
When a plaintiff challenged corporate behavior at law,judges were just as likely to look at the network of contracts
through which the corporation was formed as to its public
charter. In what Horwitz calls the "private artificial entity"
theory, courts began to think of the corporation as a "trust
fund" for its owners.'
1. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65-107 (1992).
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All this changed after the Civil War, when railroad
receivership cases undermined the trust fund theory and
regulatory cases undermined the public theory of the
corporation. In both areas of the law, legal professionals
reconceptualized the corporation as a natural person with
rights prior to the state or owners. Consider receivership
law. Between 1870 and 1900, over half the railroad mileage
in the United States went bankrupt. Since there was no
uniform national bankruptcy law, failed railroads landed in
federal courts, where receivers were appointed to reorganize
property. Before the 1880s, when railroad corporations
defaulted on bonds, their creditors took them to court where
they asked judges to appoint temporary receivers to oust
incumbent managers, reorganize the property, and devise
an equitable payment plan. In 1884, managers for Jay
Gould's Wabash Railway entered a federal district court in
St. Louis and asked the judge to place their corporation in
receivership prior to default and appoint them as receivers.
The railway corporation, counsel argued, was a natural
entity whose value derived from its perpetual life and
systemic integrity. If the court were to grant rights to
creditors, they would gut the system. Only by protecting the
corporate person would the courts preserve value to owners,
workers, shippers, and the state. The court complied. In a
series of "friendly receiverships," which reorganized the
American railway net over the next two decades, the
Wabash departure became standard practice, and the
natural entity theory of the corporation displaced the
private artificial theory.2
The reconstitution of the corporation through railroad
receivership opened the door to other industries. As
economic sociologist William Roy demonstrates, the success
of corporate attorneys and investment bankers in securing
perpetual life for railroad corporations emboldened them
to challenge statutory restrictions on intercorporate
shareholding. If railroads could be treated as natural
persons, they reasoned, then all industrial corporations
2. See GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917, at 47-72 (1994). On the role of the legal
profession in reorganizing the corporation, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison
ed., 1988).
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should have authority to buy and sell property at will.
Drawing on the receivership precedent, attorneys for
Standard Oil Corporation rewrote New Jersey law to allow
corporations to hold property in other corporations. In doing
so, they licensed the great merger wave from 1898 to 1904,
which created many of the twentieth century's most
dominant corporations. 3
A similar fate befell the public theory of the corporation
in railroad regulation. In 1877, the Supreme Court heard a
challenge to state railroad rate regulation. The carriers
charged Midwestern legislatures with confiscating
corporate property, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The Court disagreed.
Railroad corporations were common carriers. As such, they
were affected with the public interest and legitimately
subject to the Constitution's police power. Only Justice
Field dissented. The affectation doctrine, he complained,
opened the door to unlimited regulation. It was the Court's
responsibility to draw a distinction between ordinary
market transactions and those affected with the public
interest. Ten years later, when Congress created a national
commission to regulate railroad rates (the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC)), the carriers protested again.
In a series of cases in the 1890s, which severely restricted
the ICC's control over rates, Field's dissent became
doctrine. Though the Court ratified the ICC's authority to
regulate rates, it drew a line at the market. Like natural
persons, the railroad corporations had an inviolable right to
respond to competition and changing market conditions.
While the rate cases did not preclude regulation, they
limited state power by naturalizing the market, the
corporate person, and the right to contract. 4
3. WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997); Rachel Parker-Gwin & William G. Roy,
Corporate Law and the Organization of Property in the United States: The
Origin and Institutionalization of New Jersey Corporation Law, 1888-1903, 24
POL. & SOC'Y 111 (1996).
4. See generally BERK, supra note 2, at 75-115. On the implications of Field's
logic for antitrust, see RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA,
1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (1996). On the effects of Field's logic and
the rate cases on the Lochner Court, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESEIGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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The transformation of corporate status did not go
unnoticed. Between 1870 and the First World War, social
movements, interest groups, and political parties
(re)fashioned themselves in its wake. However, they
disagreed over what to do about corporate power. One
faction, which I call the critical denaturalizers, condemned
the corporate person as a cancer in the body politic.
Drawing on classical republicanism, they worried it created
unassailable privilege, corrupted democratic government,
and locked the poor into permanent servitude. Corporate
power was a political construct, insisted the denaturalizers;
therefore, it could be reshaped to the republican ends of
equality, virtuous citizenship, and a state devoted to the
public good. From the National Labor Union and the
Greenback-Labor Party in the 1870s, to the Knights of
Labor and the Farmers' Alliance in the 1880s, to the
Peoples' Party of the 1890s, critical denaturalizers
organized politically to reinvigorate a public theory of the
corporation in banking policy, railroad regulation and
antitrust.5
Critical reifiers, by contrast, welcomed corporate
naturalism because they believed it delegitimated the legal
and cultural authority of nineteenth century individualism,
which had become an obstacle to equality. Beginning in the
1870s, trade unionists argued that industrial concentration
had lain to rest the myth that individual workers could
bargain effectively with employers. Only collective action
could equalize the power of labor and capital. But
5. The distinction between critical denaturalizers and critical reifiers
parallels Victoria Hattam's distinction between producers and workers in the
late nineteenth century labor movement. See Victoria Hattam, Economic
Visions and Political Strategies: American Labor and the State, 1865-1896, in 4
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 82 (Karen Orren & Stephen
Skowronek eds., 1990). The literature on critical denaturalizers among late
nineteenth century social movements is quite large. For some good examples,
see BERK, supra note 2, at 75-115; LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE
KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1983); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL
WAR (1970); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT
IN AMERICA (1976); GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE
ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA (1997); NICK
SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST (1982); Richard
Oestreicher, Terrence Powderly, The Knights of Labor, and Artisanal
Republicanism, in LABOR LEADERS IN AMERICA 30 (Melvyn Dubofsky & Warren
Van Tine eds., 1987).
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nineteenth century employers successfully challenged
unions in the courts. Drawing an analogy to the artificial
private theory of the corporation, they cast labor relations
as a nexus of individual contracts. When unions engaged in
collective action, they conspired to restrain trade and
oppress both employers and workers. The New York
Workingmen's Assembly, the Federation of Organized
Trades and Labor Unions, and the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) protested. Capital was organized; therefore,
labor must be too. They applauded judges who naturalized
corporate enterprise, because they undermined the
foundations of the conspiracy doctrine and opened the door
to legal naturalization for other groups. Should the courts
apply the same logic to unions they applied to corporations,
the labor movement could begin to redress organized
business power through economic action. Unlike the critical
denaturalizers, who hoped to alter corporate status though
politics, the AFL naturalized the corporate person because
it promised to legitimate countervailing power in trade
unions. Thus, despite their differences, neither the Knights
of Labor nor the AFL is well understood as a "primordial
association." Both constituted themselves in relation to the
business corporation and the state.6
In some narratives, corporate naturalism was victorious
by the turn of the nineteenth century. Legal change enabled
the "corporate reconstruction of American capitalism" in the
great merger wave, and the AFL displaced the Knights of
Labor. The result was to set the United States on a
pluralist path of group competition, which many political
scientists, legal historians, and institutional economists
associate with the post-New Deal polity.7 By 1952,
6. Hattam, supra note 5, at 88-106. For good examples of critical reifiers in
the progressive movement and the New Deal, see HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE
OF AMERICAN LIFE (Archon Books 1963) (1909); CHARLES FORCEY, THE
CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM, CROLY, WEYL, LIPPMAN, AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA,
1900-1925 (1961); ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). For a more general
critique of "primordial associations," and an argument that all interest groups
are institutionally created see ELIZABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE'S LOBBY:
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1890-1925 (1997); and THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED
DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (2003).
7. See, e.g., THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
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economist John Kenneth Galbraith declared the
transformation of American capitalism complete. Where
markets once disciplined business, corporate power
necessitated "countervailing powers" in government,
interest groups, and trade unions.8
A closer look, however, reveals ongoing debate.
Corporate denaturalizers remained alive in the antitrust
movement. From Louis Brandeis to Estes Kefauver, and
from anti-chain store activists to the current movement to
rein-in Wal-Mart, critics of the corporate person have
advocated a more public theory of the corporation. More
recently, environmentalists, frustrated by the failures of
countervailing power in the Environmental Protection
Agency, have begun to revisit the political ontology of the
modern corporation. Many twentieth century critics of
corporate power-from Brandeis to Thurmond Arnold to
David Korten-have drawn evocatively from the nineteenth
century critique of corporate naturalization. Some, like the
environmentalist Richard Grossman, who co-founded the
Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy in 1994, and
political scientist Robert Dahl, return to the late nineteenth
century contest over the legal status of corporations to
demonstrate the contingent origins of corporate personhood
and to recover lost alternatives. Others argue that,
whatever its origins, the business corporation has become a
political organization, and so its legal status must be
rethought.9  Either way, the opposition to corporate
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 (1988); Richard
Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? Notes on the Evolution
of an American Creed, in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT 113 (Earl F. Cheit ed.,
1964); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Katherine Van Wenzel Stone, The Postwar
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
8. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952).
9. See HAWLEY, supra note 6; DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE
THE WORLD (1995); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
(1984); Gerald Berk, Neither Markets nor Administration: Brandeis and the
Antitrust Reforms of 1914, in 8 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
24 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds., 1994); Robert Dahl, On Removing
Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 1
(1977); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 1011 (2005); Richard Grossman, Can Corporations be Accountable? (pts.
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naturalization pioneered by the Knights of Labor and the
populists in the nineteenth century has survived, and the
deeper debate over corporate status continues.
This brief history of corporate naturalization and its
discontents has attempted to deepen Professor Galanter's
account of the causes of corporate power and broaden his
account of its adversaries. In doing so, I have argued that
legal theory matters in three ways. First, the organizational
power of business corporations originates in the law. The
capacity of railroad and industrial corporations to
legitimate their claims before the shareholders and the
state depended upon the legal reconstruction of the
corporation from an artificial entity to a natural person.
Second, associations challenging corporate power are no
less legal artifacts than the corporation itself. They have
constituted themselves in relation to the corporate theory
and the state. Third, discontent with corporate power has
taken radically different forms. Critical reifiers have
naturalized corporate personhood because they believe it
legitimates countervailing power in groups and the state.
Critical denaturalizers have opposed the corporate person
because they believe it creates unassailable privilege. And,
although the former gained more attention in the twentieth
century, the debate rages on. For, as Professor Galanter
shows, how we make sense of the modern corporation at
law has important practical consequences.
1 & 2), 609 RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY. (July 30, 1998), 610 RACHEL'S
ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY. (Aug. 6, 1998), available at http://www.poclad.org/articles/
grossman0l.html. On POCLAD, more generally, see http://www.poclad.org (last
visted Oct. 11, 2005).
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